Тип публикации: доклад, тезисы доклада, статья из сборника материалов конференций
Конференция: V Международная научная конференция "Институциональная трансформация экономики: пространство и время"; Кемерово; Кемерово
Год издания: 2017
Ключевые слова: principal, agent, client, corruption, collusion
Аннотация: In this paper a new definition of corruption has been proposed. The existing definitions of corruption in the literature such as ‘misuse of public office for private gains' (Svensson, 2005: p. 20) confine this illegal activity only within those who hold public offices. The argument here is that this activity is termed as corruptionПоказать полностьюbecause it reduces net welfare for the society increasing private gains. There are cases where activities carried out by individuals not holding public office also reduce public welfare. When a firm owner evades tax, he actually appropriates public money because the taxable portion of her profit is public money. I, therefore, argue that the appropriation of money in this case should be considered corruption as well. I propose this definition of corruption: ‘corruption is non-compliance of law by any individual for direct monetary gains, which reduces public welfare while the lawis set by a state or an international organization statutorily approved by that state which the individual belongs to.' Corruption is a governance issue and the causes of corruption have been explained as an agency problem in agency structure where principal assigns an agent setting some preferences with the expectation of certain outcomes. This agency relationship exists in both private and public sectors. In the existing literature on the ‘principal-agent-client' theory the definition of principal in public sector case is neither clear nor logical. In this paper the term, principal has been re-defined. In doing that the chronological developments on the theory has been analytically discussed starting from Rose-Ackerman (1978). The central idea of my definition of principal is that who would be the principal in an agency structure of public sector depends on whether he or she acts for the interest of the people of the country whole-heartedly. For example, for the distribution of fertilizer from the statethe local MP may be considered as the principal and the dealer the agent. Although the people of the country are the principal because the distribution of fertilizer by the state is a public good. Since the MP is their representative, he may be believed to act for the interest of people. But as soon as the MP deviates from the role of upholding the public interest with 100% devotion, is longer the principal. He may deviate from his role which people have voted for, by selecting a dealer from partisan consideration or by instructing the dealer to distribute fertilizer unfairly for some kind of gains. The remedy for corruption has also been explained in the agency structure in the literature. One of the key challenges in combatting corruption is to prevent collusion between the agent and client. A new model has been proposed to solve this problem of collusion. In order to monitor a government official, for example, a tax officer, a group of persons instead of one person has been proposed where the group would be formed by the people of conflicting interests.
Выпуск журнала: 1
Номера страниц: 186-192
Издатель: Кемеровский государственный университет